Causal Reasoning without Mechanism

In my dissertation I introduced the domain-matching heuristic. Here I team up with developmental psychologist Selma Dundar-Coecke and Steven Sloman to test my theory on children. The work—entitled Causal Reasoning without Mechanism—is available in PLoS ONE.

New Paper in SIGCHI: "Causal Interactions"

In this paper we present two design guidelines, causal order and continuity, to be used as rules of thumb for designing intuitive interactions based on principles of causal reasoning. We propose that designing interactions to behave like real-world systems of cause and effect makes them more intuitive. Using these basic principles avoids the limitations inherent to specific metaphors. In three experiments, participants solved puzzles using variations of a novel graphical interface. Participants using interfaces that were consistent with the causal guidelines consistently solved the puzzle faster than participants using inconsistent interfaces. We also discuss common interactions already consistent with the causal guidelines as well as areas where the guidelines are likely to apply successfully. The causal order guidelines provide specific utility while also demonstrating how principles of causal psychology can be applied to help interface designers better convey the functionality of their interfaces.

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Risk judgment in Obsessive–Compulsive Disorder: Testing a dual-systems account

Dual-systems theorists posit distinct modes of reasoning. The intuition system reasons automatically and its processes are unavailable to conscious introspection. The deliberation system reasons effortfully while its processes recruit working memory. The current paper extends the application of such theories to the study of Obsessive–Compulsive Disorder (OCD). Patients with OCD often retain insight into their irrationality, implying dissociable systems of thought: intuition produces obsessions and fears that deliberation observes and attempts (vainly) to inhibit. To test the notion that dual-systems theory can adequately describe OCD, we obtained speeded and unspeeded risk judgments from OCD patients and non-anxious controls in order to quantify the differential effects of intuitive and deliberative reasoning. As predicted, patients deemed negative events to be more likely than controls. Patients also took more time in producing judgments than controls. Furthermore, when forced to respond quickly patients' judgments were more affected than controls'. Although patients did attenuate judgments when given additional time, their estimates never reached the levels of controls’. We infer from these data that patients have genuine difficulty inhibiting their intuitive cognitive system. Our dual-systems perspective is compatible with current theories of the disorder. Similar behavioral tests may prove helpful in better understanding related anxiety disorders.

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Anchoring Base Rates

I helped Joachim Krueger teach psychology at Brown after which he wrote this unifying post on pitting heuristics against each other:

“One of the most famous findings in the psychology of prediction is the phenomenon of base rate neglect. People mainly rely on judgments of representativeness. They assign an instance to the category whose prototype it resembles the most without regard to the relative size of the category. When the category is very small, the heuristic of representativeness leads to systematic overcategorization. Physicians overdiagnose rare diseases when the symptoms reflect the disease’s typical pattern, ordinary people overestimate the size of stereotyped minority groups, and scientific significance testers are too accepting of improbable alternatives to the null hypothesis.”

Friends with Personalities

I wrote an essay on the personalities of friends with Joachim Krueger and Leonard Chen for Psychology Today:

“In a somber mood, one might think that characters on U.S. American television are uni-dimensional. Sitcom characters in particular may be funny by virtue of being caricatures without depth. On Scrubs, J.D. is whiny, Elliot is insecure, Carla is domineering, Dr. Cox is psychopathically emotionless, and the janitor is janitorial. Perhaps we are stereotyping; by stopping after listing the first attribute that comes to mind, we are caricaturing the caricatures. One claim the Big-5 taxonomy of personality traits can lay to having depth is that it has, well, not 3 or 4, but 5 personality traits. With these traits being fairly independent of one another, describing each person on one more trait dimension adds complexity to the profile.”

New Paper: Trust and self-control: The moderating role of the default

Full article:

According to recent dual-process theories, interpersonal trust is influenced by both impulsive and deliberative processes. The present research explores the determinants of deliberative trust, investigating how trust decisions are affected by the availability of cognitive resources. We test the interaction of two relevant factors: self-control (the ability to exert mental control over one’s behavior) and the default response (a preselected option that requires minimal or no effort). Past research has shown that self-control has extensive effects on social behavior and decision making. Here, we report that the effect of self-control on trust depends on the default. Across two studies, we find no direct link between self control and trust. Instead, self-control affects trust indirectly by influencing the level of effort in decision making. Poor self-control (due to experimental depletion or trait-based differences) predicts adherence to the default—the response that requires the least effort.

Review of Rational Choice in an Uncertain World: The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making by Reid K. Hastie and Robyn M. Dawes

I co-authored The Tangled Web of Rationality, a book review of Rational Choice in an Uncertain World: The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making by Reid K. Hastie and Robyn M. Dawes, in the American Journal of Psychology. Available here.

Reason and Emotion: A note on Plato, Darwin, and Damasio

I wrote this post with Joachim Krueger and Anthony Evans:

“It is common to think that emotions interfere with rational thinking. Plato described emotion and reason as two horses pulling us in opposite directions. Modern dual-systems models of judgment and decision-making are Platonic in the sense that they endorse the antagonism between reason and emotion. The activities of one system are automatic and often emotional, whereas the activities of the other are controlled and never emotional. The automatic system gets things done quickly, but it is prone to error. The controlled system’s mission is to keep a watchful eye and to make corrections when necessary. Like a watchful parent, this system reins in our impulses and overrides our snap judgments.”